UNITED NATIONS

General Assembly

FORTY-EIGHTH SESSION

Official Records

FIRST COMMITTEE
4th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 19 October 1993
at 10 a.m.
New York

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 4th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. von WAGNER (Germany)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of the publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-794, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/48/SR.4
5 November 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

93-81672 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ITEMS (continued)

1. Mr. CHAPPUIS (Observer for Switzerland) said that, since the chances of achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT) were better than ever before, Switzerland supported the granting of a mandate for those purposes to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Achievement of a CTBT would also facilitate the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT was an important and well-tested instrument, but it entailed unequal obligations for its parties and the extension of the Treaty and the accession of all States would mark a major contribution to the cause of non-proliferation.

2. Switzerland hoped that more countries would join the more than 150 which had already signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and that the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons would succeed in preparing an effective monitoring instrument. His Government was ready to provide industrial inspectors for the future control body and to place a mobile laboratory at its disposal.

3. Although 20 years previously States had doubted the necessity for a system to monitor biological weapons, recent developments had caused them fundamentally to revise that view and to establish the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential Verification Measures from a Scientific and Technical Standpoint (the VEREX process). Switzerland had always attached great importance to the evaluation of verification possibilities and therefore favoured the convening of a conference of States parties to that end.

4. Switzerland was convinced that the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva would continue to have a vital role in the years to come, and had requested admission to the Conference as a full member, in order better to be able to contribute to its work. It had been disappointed, therefore, by the failure to reach consensus on expanding the membership of the Conference at its previous session.

5. The Swiss people had been deeply shocked by the diversion of legally exported Swiss products for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, and the Government had subsequently imposed strict export controls. While international agreements were jointly implemented by the States parties, export controls remained national measures with no element of multilateral cooperation. Consequently, Switzerland hoped that disarmament agreements would be sufficiently strengthened to render such controls unnecessary.

6. Immense human suffering was also caused by conventional arms, and efforts must be made to strengthen international humanitarian law and to prevent certain types of particularly cruel weapons. Since the Charter of the United Nations established the right of States to have recourse to military force when their safety was threatened, no general prohibition of conventional arms was possible; instead, an effective and internationally accepted system of regulations should be devised.

7. The establishment of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was a major step forward, in terms both of promoting transparency and of furthering a

(Mr. Chappuis, Observer, Switzerland)

multilateral approach to arms transfers. War led to violation of the principles of humanitarian law, and wider accession to the Geneva Conventions and support for the International Committee of the Red Cross in its work on behalf of civilian populations were therefore important. In addition, Switzerland supported the proposal for a review conference in 1994 on the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. It was important to increase the number of parties to the Convention and to enhance respect for the norms currently in force by appropriate training measures within armed forces. The scope of the Convention should be widened to include non-international conflicts and to strengthen such measures as the demarcation and clearing of minefields provided for by Protocol II of the Convention. Switzerland strongly believed in the need for an effective prohibition on the use of anti-personnel mines as defined by the Convention and its Protocol II.

8. In conclusion, he stressed that armaments were less the cause than the consequence of conflicts and that efforts should be made to address the root causes of those conflicts, such as human rights violations, ethnic strife, political persecution, ignorance and extreme poverty. Those problems would be best tackled by a regional approach like that offered by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process, which had achieved notable success in overcoming the cold war in Europe. Similar approaches could yield comparable results in other regions of the world, notably the Middle East.

9. Mr. WHANNOU (Benin) said that, despite the recent historic changes on the international scene, the world remained riven by civil wars, territorial disintegration and ethnic, religious and tribal confrontations. While the signing of START II by the two major nuclear Powers had been a major step forward, other nuclear Powers must be encouraged to follow suit. Moreover, START I must, once ratified by Ukraine, be implemented on the basis of the Lisbon Protocol. In addition, vigorous efforts should be made to renounce the policy of nuclear deterrence, to dismantle nuclear weapons deployed beyond national frontiers, to achieve a complete cessation of nuclear tests and to ensure that moratoriums on nuclear tests were not broken and, finally, to ensure that objective, and not selective, application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to dual-purpose facilities, compulsory inspection of suspect nuclear facilities, and reconversion of nuclear capacity to peaceful purposes. In addition, the 1995 NPT review conference would provide an opportunity to transform the Treaty into an effective instrument for full nuclear disarmament and international cooperation in the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

10. Among other areas of concern, he drew attention to the issue of chemical weapons and stressed the need to secure the accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention of the few chemical weapon-possessing States which still remained outside it. With regard to the Biological Weapons Convention, Benin believed that its effectiveness would be enhanced by a verification regime, and therefore supported the convening in 1994 of an ad hoc conference of parties to determine means of strengthening the relevant verification machinery. It was essential to harness the peaceful benefits of science and technology to advance the process of disarmament, inter alia, by ensuring that the destruction of existing weapons did not damage public health or the environment.

(Mr. Whannou, Benin)

11. International security was also threatened by non-military factors, such as dehumanizing socio-economic and environmental conditions, and in that regard too appropriate technology had a vital role to play. Benin therefore urged the speedy implementation, if necessary with modifications, of the action programme adopted at the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. If conflicts were to be prevented before they spiralled out of control, serious attention must be given to the socio-economic dimension of security. Strengthened international cooperation would assist the implementation of development programmes, whose financing would benefit from the long-awaited peace dividend. In that context, Benin looked forward to the forthcoming report by the Secretary-General on an agenda for development.

12. He welcomed the recommendations by the Disarmament Commission concerning regional disarmament measures, which should be further strengthened. While Benin supported the initiative put forward by the Secretary-General to review the mandates of the regional centres for disarmament in the light of new world realities, it expressed concern at the current problems faced by the centre for Africa, which was in danger of closing down. Increased efforts were required to ensure the final denuclearization of the African continent. In addition, African States were concerned at the dumping of dangerous and radioactive wastes and increased international cooperation was called for to combat that practice, using in particular the possibilities created by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development and the Convention on the Law of the Sea.

13. In other regions, the decision by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to suspend its withdrawal from the NPT would be conducive to disarmament in South Asia, while in Latin America acceptance of the proposed amendments to the Treaty of Tlatelolco would permit its entry into force and subsequent wider accession to it.

14. The exploration of ways to enhance international disarmament machinery and to adapt it to new international realities had been considerably advanced by the Secretary-General's report on new dimensions of the regulations of arms and disarmament in the post-cold-war period. Benin stressed the need to ensure the proper interaction of the various components of such machinery, since disarmament should be the common business of all, pursued in the interests of all. The Security Council had a particularly important role to play in that endeavour, in accordance with its mandate under Article 26 of the Charter.

15. His delegation strongly believed that the membership of the Conference on Disarmament should be expanded and its selection processes made transparent and objective, with limited membership periods to enable all States to participate in its work. Since the Conference was responsible for negotiating multilateral disarmament accords of a universal scope it was important that its representation should also be universal.

16. Lastly, the Centre for Disarmament Affairs should be strengthened.

17. Mr. TANAKA (Japan) said that in a period of transition, it was more important than ever before to build confidence among nations through multilateral cooperation in order to maintain and strengthen international peace

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

and security. The international community must take measures to tackle the problem of both the transfer and the proliferation of various kinds of weapons.

18. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems was a problem that demanded urgent attention. The NPT provided an important legal framework for reconciling the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons with that of promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, thus enhancing world security. Japan had on many occasions stressed the importance of strengthening that regime by enhancing its universality. It welcomed the accession of Belarus to the NPT and hoped that Kazakhstan and Ukraine would accede to it as non-nuclear-weapon States. It was important that all States, both nuclear and non-nuclear, make serious efforts to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime. Japan supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty beyond 1995; however, that did not mean perpetuating the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

19. The international security environment was markedly different from that which had prevailed at the time of the Fourth Review Conference of NPT. The signing of the START II treaty represented significant progress towards nuclear disarmament. Japan hoped that Ukraine would speedily ratify the START I treaty and that sharp reductions would be achieved in nuclear arsenals on both sides. Japan had demonstrated its readiness to help promote the process of dismantling nuclear weapons by announcing its readiness to assist in related fields. The question of prohibiting the production of nuclear fissile materials for weapons purposes required the serious attention of all States.

20. Important progress had been made towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. Japan welcomed the commitments announced by the United States, France and the Russian Federation to the moratorium on nuclear testing. Japan, the only victim of nuclear bombing, strongly objected to nuclear testing by any State. The suspension of nuclear tests had made possible the early initiation of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (CTBT). The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to give a negotiating mandate to the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban was of great significance in the history of nuclear disarmament.

21. It was deeply regrettable that China had carried out a nuclear test in October 1993; Japan hoped that the negotiations towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban would not be impeded by the test. It urged China not to carry out any further nuclear testing, and called upon other nuclear-weapon States to continue to refrain from conducting nuclear tests. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty would be an extremely important instrument, not only for halting and reversing the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons but also for preventing their horizontal proliferation. Inasmuch as the Conference on Disarmament was the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, it was imperative that a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty be negotiated by the Conference from the earliest stages. The negotiations should be given the highest priority.

22. Any substantive progress made on negative security assurances in 1994 could help build a favourable environment for the 1995 NPT review conference. Progress on concrete nuclear disarmament measures would have a positive impact

(Mr. Tanaka, Japan)

on the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as the outcome of the 1995 conference.

23. Japan attached great importance to the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

24. The question of non-proliferation of systems for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction was also a matter for urgent international consideration. The Missile Technology Control Regime was an export control mechanism which had been effectively preventing the uncontrolled proliferation of such weapons and related technologies, and it had Japan's full support.

25. As had been demonstrated in the Gulf war, the uncontrolled transfer of conventional weapons could destabilize a region and thus give rise to armed conflict. Self-restraint by arms suppliers was essential. It was also the responsibility of the international community to take effective measures to stop the unregulated and unprincipled transfer of weapons. The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms was an important element in that endeavour; Japan hoped that a substantially larger number of States would join its regime. Japan would continue to cooperate with other nations to achieve broader participation and to improve and develop the Register. It felt that there was also a need to promote regional cooperation and to devise supplementary measures on transparency adjusted to the specific characteristics of each region. It supported the decision of the Conference on Disarmament to have the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in Armaments continue its deliberations in 1994.

26. Mr. de ARAUJO CASTRO (Brazil), speaking as Chairman of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, introduced the Commission's report (A/48/42) on the work of its 1993 session. The results of the 1993 substantive session had served to reaffirm the value of the Commission and to demonstrate that it was able to function effectively as a multilateral forum. The Commission had adopted by consensus the "Guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security".

27. The Commission had considered two important topics: the process of nuclear disarmament in the framework of international peace and security, with the objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons and the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields. The first topic had been held over for conclusion in 1994; as to the second topic, the Commission had come very close to agreeing on a comprehensive set of substantive guidelines and recommendations. The Commission's decision to allow another year for the conclusion of work on that topic reflected the seriousness with which different countries, developed and developing, saw the need to engage in a greater degree of multilateral dialogue and cooperation.

28. The Commission would be holding an organizational session in early December. Before then, it would be necessary to settle the question of including a new substantive item in the Commission's agenda for 1994. Proposals for additional items already existed in the preamble to General Assembly resolution 47/54 A. At the organizational session, the Commission would elect a Chairman for 1994 who, in accordance with the principle of geographical

(Mr. de Araujo Castro, Brazil)

rotation, was expected to be provided by the Group of African States. It would also elect the other members of the bureau and the chairmen of the working groups, including a chairman for the working group that would deal with the new item to be included in the Commission's agenda.

29. The results of the Commission's 1993 session confirmed that the United Nations was in a unique position to play a more productive role in the field of disarmament, at a time when a greater degree of dialogue, understanding and cooperation was clearly needed.

30. Mr. ARCILLA (Philippines) said that the optimistic atmosphere which had prevailed in the Committee the previous year had fast disappeared in the face of the outbreak of new or renewed regional and international conflicts to which the mechanisms set in place during the cold war were unable to respond. The situation was compounded by domestic problems, which placed restrictions on foreign policy and the resources available for international concerns.

31. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remained the greatest potential threat to international peace and security, although the significance of the proliferation of conventional arms, particularly in the conflicts being waged in the developing world, should not be underestimated. Greater responsibility was required on the part of all States, but above all those who manufactured and supplied such weapons. The Philippines had always advocated the elimination of weapons of mass destruction as well as the reduction of conventional arms. It looked forward to universal adherence to the NPT in the near future, since all the declared nuclear States and permanent members of the Security Council had become parties to the Treaty. The 1995 NPT review conference should both review the implementation of the Treaty and decide on its extension and his delegation was in favour of strengthening the NPT regime as well as of the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

32. With regard to nuclear testing, the Philippines maintained that a CTBT would be the most effective way to encourage the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore endorsed the mandate for negotiations conferred on the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. It also supported the consultations being conducted by the President of the Amendment Conference of the partial test-ban treaty, which it had been agreed should be continued with a view to resuming the Conference.

33. The nuclear-test moratorium provided a healthy environment for negotiating a permanent ban on such tests, and his delegation was therefore disappointed that a test had recently been conducted in its region. It hoped that no further testing would take place and that all the nuclear Powers would step up efforts to negotiate a comprehensive and permanent ban.

34. Countries should be encouraged to take advantage of the current favourable political climate by entering into negotiations for the peaceful settlement of disputes with their neighbours, for real and lasting peace at the regional level and world wide could best be achieved through dialogue and mutual trust.

35. The Convention on Chemical Weapons, signed by the Philippines in 1993, was a major achievement in world disarmament, as it struck a fine balance between

(Mr. Arcilla, Philippines)

the imperatives of economic and technical development and verification measures. The Philippines also welcomed initiatives such as the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms which promoted openness and transparency - prerequisites for the rational reduction of armaments.

36. In South-East Asia the foundations for an era of peace and prosperity were being laid. Notable achievements by the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) included the Declaration on the South China Sea, aimed at instituting a region of peace, cooperation and mutual confidence-building in disputed areas, and ongoing efforts to achieve a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone.

37. Mr. NORBERG (Sweden) said that the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention and START II in January 1993 and the agreement reached in the Conference on Disarmament in August 1993 to enter into formal negotiations on a CTBT were evidence that the world had entered a new phase of security cooperation and dialogue.

38. A verifiable CTBT would serve as an important tool for nuclear disarmament and against proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was crucial that a test ban be truly comprehensive, prohibiting all nuclear explosions, including so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. His Government was looking forward to the negotiations which were to begin in January 1994 and felt that the draft treaty it had submitted to the Conference in June 1993 could serve as a basis for them. A speedy conclusion of the matter would demonstrate continued momentum in the drive to limit and finally abolish all weapons of mass destruction.

39. Sweden was encouraged by the expressions of support for preventive measures to supplement a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and felt that an international agreement to ban production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and to control such material would both strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and provide an essential element in a comprehensive network of agreements on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in general. It deplored the nuclear test carried out by China on 5 October 1993, but hoped, nevertheless, that the de facto moratorium on nuclear tests would be observed by all nuclear-weapon States and that China would refrain from further testing. The nuclear-weapon States had an important responsibility in that regard as further testing could jeopardize an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

40. No effort should be spared to strengthen the NPT, adherence to which was firmly established as a norm for international behaviour. All nations must become parties to the Treaty and faithfully implement existing safeguards agreements. The commitment of the parties to the Treaty would be decisive in the successful preparation of the NPT conference in 1995 and in providing for the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

41. The START agreements constituted another cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. However, they would be complete only with the adherence of all States in the former Soviet Union which had nuclear weapons on their territories. Ukraine should ratify START I without further delay, and it was imperative that Kazakhstan and Ukraine follow Belarus in acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

42. The dissolution of the Soviet Union had aggravated concerns about clandestine transfers of conventional weapons and even weapons of mass destruction. It was vital to minimize the risk of increasing black market sales of military arsenals at relatively low prices, particularly to areas of high political tension. Borders must be monitored - not least new borders - to ensure full control and transparency in that respect, and early warning systems were needed to indicate where and when national or international action was warranted. To that end, Sweden was cooperating with several members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in strengthening border and customs controls, and with the Russian Federation in the destruction of chemical weapons by providing expertise for such purposes.

43. Transfers of weapons of mass destruction must be prevented, but it was also necessary to monitor trade in essential components, equipment and weapons materials, such as uranium and plutonium, and to prevent the proliferation of know-how for the production of weapons of mass destruction. Opportunities should be sought to utilize the vast military expertise in the former Soviet Union for peaceful purposes and facilitate the process of conversion from military to civilian production. With that aim, Sweden had allocated funds to the science and technology centres to be established in Moscow and Kiev, which could give weapons experts the opportunity to contribute to peace and economic growth.

44. Over 150 States had now signed the Convention on Chemical Weapons, but only four countries had so far ratified it. For the Convention to enter into force at the earliest possible date it was imperative that States now take the necessary measures for speedy ratification. Ratification by the Russian Federation was of particular importance in view of the 40,000 tons of chemical warfare agents on its territory.

45. That Convention, including its verification regime, might serve as an inspiration for the international community to achieve the same goal in other fields. The Biological Weapons Convention could thus be equipped with adequate verification mechanisms, and his delegation urged the States parties to the Convention to request the convening of a special conference to examine the final report of the VEREX process.

46. Another important issue was the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities, which could have disastrous consequences, and should be discussed as a separate item on a revised agenda of the Conference on Disarmament.

47. The international community must strengthen its ability to respond to the problem of the spread of conventional weapons, and his Government welcomed the fact that the disarmament and arms control agenda was now increasingly focused on such weapons. Much, however, remained to be done. In 1993 national reports had been submitted to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms for the first time. For that instrument to acquire a universal character, however, it was essential for all Member States to provide information. Nevertheless, expanding the scope of the Register too rapidly could increase the difficulties of compiling data, and it should therefore be expanded in a careful and gradual manner.

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

48. Sweden supported the convening of a review conference of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, primarily to negotiate stronger rules or mechanisms to protect civilian populations against the effects of anti-personnel mines, but also to discuss other weapon categories, such as naval mines and anti-personnel laser weapons.

49. Like the United Nations in general, the disarmament organs of the United Nations should be reformed to respond to new realities. Although the general division of labour between the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament was well established, at least in theory, there was a generally recognized need to continue to improve the working methods of all three bodies in order to ensure efficiency and to avoid duplication of work. He hoped that during the current session the First Committee would agree on appropriate steps to rationalize its work and reform its agenda, including the proposals that related substantive issues should be dealt with in clusters under one heading, that a number of topics should be dealt with on a biannual or triannual basis and that the consideration of clearly obsolete items should be terminated. Further steps should also be taken to allow the Disarmament Commission to focus in greater depth on important items and submit concrete recommendations on them. The Conference on Disarmament, after concluding an agreement on CTBT, should in future address other areas of particular significance, such as confidence-building measures for the maintenance of peace and stability and regional security arrangements. In addition, the composition of the Conference should be altered to correspond to present-day realities. The proposal worked out by Ambassador O'Sullivan of Australia was constructive and should provide the basis for a solution to the problem before the end of the current year.

50. Mr. WISNUMURTI (Indonesia) said that the Committee was meeting at a time of extraordinary flux, great promise and unprecedented opportunities. The easing of ideological contention had opened vast new possibilities of significant arms reductions, while the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security had been further strengthened. The successful conclusion of START II had made an important contribution to reducing the arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States of America, and his delegation hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would follow suit and would work with the United States to seek a ban on the production of nuclear materials for weapons and institute international inspections of nuclear stockpiles.

51. The accession of Belarus to the NPT was a welcome development; his delegation was confident that Kazakhstan and Ukraine would likewise accede. It also welcomed the further impetus given to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones by the full applicability of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the progress made in the ongoing endeavours to implement the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. The universality and early implementation of the Convention on Chemical Weapons must remain one of the priority objectives of the international community. The decision by the Conference on Disarmament to give its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban a mandate to negotiate a comprehensive test-ban treaty was to be applauded. His delegation shared the view of the Group of 21 that the time had come to proceed with all deliberate speed and to achieve the long-sought goal of a comprehensive test ban by 1994.

(Mr.Wisnumurti, Indonesia)

52. The resumption of testing by a nuclear Power earlier in the current month must be viewed with utmost concern. It was imperative that nuclear-weapon States refrain from a new round of testing and fulfil their commitment to negotiate a total ban by the year 1996. The timely conclusion of a CTBT was also of critical importance, for without it efforts to extend the NPT might be adversely affected, as the duration of the treaty had been explicitly linked to the fulfilment of obligations undertaken by the signatories, especially by the depositary States. Moreover, the provisions of the NPT needed to be carefully reviewed and reassessed in the light of the requirements of the 1990s and beyond. Thus, the success of the 1995 review conference would ultimately depend on an objective reappraisal of the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States and the endeavours to transform the Treaty into a truly universal non-discriminatory regime.

53. A genuine, global non-proliferation regime could be fostered by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) had for some years been seeking to establish a South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the draft treaty for the purpose was in its final stage of preparation. Indonesia hoped that some nuclear Powers which had opposed the initiative would now be ready to reconsider their position. In the post-cold-war political setting their opposition had become untenable, especially since transit rights would remain unaffected in the regime envisioned for the region. Consultations would be held with other States, particularly the nuclear Powers, to secure their support in completing the draft treaty. Its early implementation would constitute a significant contribution by ASEAN to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

54. The ASEAN Ministers had decided in 1992 to establish the ASEAN Regional Forum, which would afford its members and other interested nations a regular opportunity for an exchange of views on security issues which, it was hoped, would help to forestall possible disputes and conflicts. Eventually, more institutionalized regional and international structures might evolve.

55. In the South China Sea, overlapping claims of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Spratly and Paracels Islands might escalate into threats to regional peace and security. Indonesia had sponsored a series of workshops to contribute to a better understanding of the issue, while ASEAN had called on the parties concerned to apply the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct in the area.

56. His delegation had listened carefully to the Chairman's observations concerning a more structured role for the First Committee and its revitalization. In Indonesia's view, the First Committee had an important role to play and specific contributions to make as a deliberative body with universal participation. As a forum for elaborating and clarifying a number of issues of pre-eminent concern to Member States, it had formulated concrete proposals and recommendations for consideration and action by other forums. Meanwhile, the trend towards greater understanding among Committee members had been reflected in the adoption of fewer resolutions - an increasing number of them by consensus - and the merging of identical resolutions. The Committee's debates had become more purposeful, constantly seeking wider areas of agreement. His delegation was therefore confident that the Committee could make a constructive

(Mr.Wisnumurti, Indonesia)

contribution to the goals of disarmament and security, and pledged its active participation in that effort. Indonesia had long supported the proposal for a rearrangement of the Committee's agenda so as to facilitate more rational and focused discussion. Such an arrangement, however, should not prejudge the substance of issues or infringe on the right of Member States to bring any relevant issues before the Committee.

57. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Kathmandu had played a pioneering role in seeking to strengthen cooperation between the United Nations and various regional and subregional organizations, and had given practical expression to the concept of regional approaches to disarmament. Its task, especially in stimulating new initiatives for negotiations and exploring fresh approaches to peace, remained unfinished. His delegation therefore called for the continuation of its activities.

58. Security and stability were pressing requirements in the Gulf region, which had experienced the environmental, economic and social consequences of conflicts in which weapons of mass destruction were deployed. With a view to building confidence and establishing the foundations for permanent peace, security and stability in the region, his country and fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council advocated the resolution of disputes through dialogue and peaceful means, and the strengthening of cooperation through good-neighbourliness.

59. Having supported and participated in the Middle East peace process, his country welcomed the Declaration of Principles signed by the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Israel as a positive step towards a just, comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Palestinian question. The final settlement would be an essential factor in creating regional and international peace, security and stability, and would have a beneficial developmental, economic and social impact on the States and peoples in the region.

60. He reiterated his country's call for all parties in Somalia to cooperate with international and regional efforts to find a peaceful solution to the problem there and thus safeguard the unity and national independence of Somalia. He likewise endorsed the efforts aimed at establishing a democratic South Africa where the people could coexist without being subjected to racial discrimination.

61. Meanwhile, a solution to the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the suffering of the population, particularly the Muslims, was among the most serious challenges facing the international community, which had shown itself powerless to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions aimed at curbing Serbian and Croatian aggression. His country therefore supported Bosnia and Herzegovina's right of individual and collective self-defence under the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

62. He urged all nuclear-weapon States to participate actively in the endeavours to conclude a CTBT and hoped that the aims of eliminating weapons of mass destruction and achieving a nuclear-test ban would be accomplished before the 1995 review of the NPT. Meanwhile, his country welcomed the United States initiative to extend the moratorium on nuclear testing and the positive response of nuclear-weapon States. The fact that 150 States, including his own, had

(Mr.Wisnumurti, Indonesia)

signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction was a productive step towards reducing the threat to international security posed by the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. The international community should also tackle the threat posed by the use and development of conventional weapons.

63. His country sanctioned the trend for the United Nations, specialized agencies and regional organizations to play a significant role in regional disarmament, which also required the support of the nuclear-weapon States. It equally favoured the establishment of zones of peace and nuclear-weapon-free zones, in which connection it called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981).

64. Disarmament and the ensuing reduction in military expenditure would allow financial resources to be rechannelled into economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries, thereby strengthening international and regional security.

65. The CHAIRMAN said that the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons had asked to make a statement. Since during the informal consultations held with a number of delegations no objection had been raised, he would take it that the Committee wished to accede to that request.

66. It was so decided.

67. Mr. KENYON (Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) said that since the signing ceremony of the Convention on Chemical Weapons, the number of signatories to the Convention had reached 151, and 4 States had already ratified it. Such an unprecedented degree of unanimity testified to the quality and balanced nature of the text of the Convention, which had been universally recognized as an effective instrument for enhancing national and global security. At its fourth session two weeks previously the Preparatory Commission had decided to encourage all States that had not yet become signatories to the Convention to do so without further delay. However, signature was only the first step in a long process. Experience had shown that the Convention could only be effective if thorough and skilled preparations were carried out for its implementation and all States concerned were willing to cooperate.

68. The drafters of the Convention had realized that considerable preparatory work would be required for its implementation. Detailed procedures needed to be developed for inspections, submission of declarations and various details of chemical technology, while the machinery to carry out those procedures, namely, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and in particular its technical secretariat, must be put in place. Moreover, considerable work had to be done by States themselves so that they would be in a position to fulfil their legal obligations and participate fully and effectively in the implementation of the Convention. The scope of the obligations under the Convention as well as the nature of its verification system were unprecedented

(Mr. Kenyon)

and, together with the time constraints imposed by its scheduled entry into force in 1995, represented a great challenge to those involved.

69. The Preparatory Commission was designed to assist the international community in meeting that challenge. With the assistance of the Provisional Technical Secretariat, it was developing appropriate procedures that would serve as a framework for the future organization and assist States in their own preparations. The Commission had set up the necessary infrastructure and concluded a Headquarters agreement with the host State - the Netherlands. Good progress had also been made in developing the procedures necessary for the implementation of the Convention. The Commission had already held four formal sessions. More specific issues were considered in the working groups meeting concurrently with the plenary, two of which, on organizational issues and on verification procedures, were currently in existence. Expert groups dealing with those specific subjects and technical cooperation and assistance, met between the plenary sessions. Their recommendations were circulated to all member States, then considered at working group level and finally by the plenary meetings. Such procedures allowed all signatory States to take part in the decision-making of the Commission.

70. The Provisional Technical Secretariat was gradually acquiring greater technical expertise and, in addition to servicing the meetings of the Commission, was able to provide assistance to member States. By the end of the year, the Provisional Technical Secretariat should have approximately 60 staff members employed in its five divisions. There were plans to expand the core staff in order to continue preparatory work for the implementation of the Convention on a broader scale. Furthermore, inspectors and additional support staff would be recruited once 65 States had ratified the Convention. The budget and programme of work for 1994 would be examined by the fifth plenary session of the Preparatory Commission in December 1993.

71. One of the most important functions of the Provisional Technical Secretariat was to develop, in cooperation with member States, the mechanisms required to verify compliance with the Convention. Detailed verification procedures were currently being prepared with the assistance of experts from national delegations. In view of the importance of its work, the Verification Division would be the largest in the secretariat, comprising six branches, one of which would be responsible for training and coordinating inspectors, analysts and other specialist staff for the Technical Secretariat. The Inspectorate would, to a great extent, be the raison d'être of the future organization, whose reputation would depend largely on the integrity and competence of the inspectors in that service. Training modules for future inspectors were being prepared by an expert group and supplementary training programmes had been launched by a number of member States.

72. Another important function of the Provisional Technical Secretariat was to assist States in their preparatory work for the implementation of the Convention. Such work included the establishment of a national authority, as envisaged by article VII of the Convention, the preparation of national databases for initial and routine declarations, and even preparations for destruction of chemical weapons. In that connection, the secretariat had

(Mr. Kenyon)

undertaken a study on the national authority describing the various options for establishing such an entity.

73. The organization was proceeding on the basis that the Inspectorate must be ready to carry out verification activities as soon as the Convention entered into force. In order to meet that deadline, at its second plenary session in April 1993, the Commission had decided on three "milestones" for planning purposes. First, the initial draft of the procedures and requirements for the implementation of the verification and other provisions in the Convention must be concluded by the end of 1993. Second, by the middle of 1994, the revised draft procedures must be completed and preparations made for the recruiting and training of inspectors and other key staff members of the Technical Secretariat immediately after the entry into force of the Convention. Third, during the last six months prior to entry into force of the Convention, the Provisional Technical Secretariat would be expanded and final preparations made for the implementation of the Convention.

74. Furthermore, member States had been requested to provide estimates, on a preliminary and confidential basis, of the number of facilities that would need to be inspected. In that connection, a meeting had taken place between the expert group on chemical industry facilities and representatives from the chemical industry which had provided the latter with an opportunity to convey to the Commission their views on the implementation of the Convention. Further meetings would be organized along those lines.

75. Since public support was required for the early entry into force of and universal adherence to the Convention, the Provisional Technical Secretariat was preparing to launch an international information campaign on the subject. It would also be working closely with Governments, representatives of chemical industry associations, research institutes and non-governmental organizations to create awareness about the requirements for data declarations and the on-site inspection regime. However, it remained the primary responsibility of the competent authorities in the signatory States to inform their domestic industry on the relevant provisions in that area.

76. It was also important that the national authorities established by signatory States should disseminate information about the benefits to be derived from the Convention. Many developing countries were concerned that the Convention would lead to tighter controls on the exchange of chemical technology and equipment that was crucial to their commercial and industrial development. The Convention struck a balance between ending the proliferation of chemical weapons and promoting the exchange of scientific and technical knowledge necessary for industrial, agricultural, medical and pharmaceutical development. Signatory States would however be subject to restrictions on trade in chemicals with non-signatory countries, and their existing chemical trade policies would have to be reviewed and brought into line with the aims of the Convention.

(Mr. Kenyon)

77. In conclusion, he stressed the need for the continuous cooperation and support of member States in the run up to the entry into force of the Convention. He was confident that the staff of the Provisional Technical Secretariat would do their utmost to contribute to the achievement of world peace and security.

The meeting rose at 12.50 p.m.